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THE APPLICATION OF THE CRANE
DOCTRINE TO LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

INTRODUCTION; CRANE V. COMMISSIONER1
The limited partnership has in recent years been the preferred vehicle
for real estate development. As a business matter, it permits, as does the
corporation, a number of persons to pool the capital necessary for
acquiring and developing real estate while enabling them to limit their
losses to the assets committed to the venture. Moreover, the limited
partnership offers tax advantages to its partners that are not available
to corporate shareholders, since each partner may apply against income
from outside sources his portion of the partnership losses., The corporate shareholder does not receive the benefit of this pass-through
because the corporation is generally treated as a distinct taxable entity
under the Internal Revenue Code.8
The ability to pass through losses from the partnership to the
individual tax return is crucial in real estate development because of
the rules governing the depreciation of partnership improvements constructed or purchased with borrowed capital. These rules were first
developed in cases which raised no issues of partnership taxation. The

0 Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California. A.B. 1964, Columbia
University; A.B. 1966, Oxford University; LL.B. 1968, Yale University.
1. 331 U.S. 1 (1946).
2. Section 701 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.]
lays down the basic rule that a partnership is not a taxable entity. Sections 702-04 of the
Code set out the basic rules for the determination of the income or loss of each partner.
If there is a loss for a particular partner, he may use it to offset income from other sources.
3. Section 11 (a) of the Code imposes a tax at the corporate level on the income of
the Corporation. Subchapter C of the Code, §§ 301-85, sets out most of the basic rules
peculiar to the taxation of the corporation and its shareholders. Under Subchapter S, it
is possible in a limited set of cases for the shareholders of a corporation to file an election
which removes the tax at the corporate level, provided that all gains and losses are taken
into account on the shareholder's returns, even if there is no distribution from the corporation to the shareholders. I.R.C. §§ 1371-79. Subchapter S, however, is not of use in
most real estate projects, except perhaps during the construction period, because any
election under Subchapter S is terminated for any taxable year in which "passive investment income," of which rents are a form, exceeds 20% of the gross receipts of the corporation. I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(A) and (C).
100
HeinOnline -- 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 100 1972

THE CRANE DOCTRINE

celebrated case of Crane v. Commissioner4 held that an individual
taxpayer was entitled to include in his cost basis an amount equal to
the mortgage placed upon the property. The decision also held that the
taxpayer should treat the balance of the mortgage left undischarged at
the time of sale "as part of the amount realized" under Section 1001 of
the Code, at least in those cases in which the value of the property
exceeded the amount of the lien.5
4. 331 U.S. 1 (1946).
5. Id. at 14 n.37. The Court indicated that it would not pass on a case where the
value of the property was less than that of the lien. The only reason why such a case
causes difficulty is that the courts cannot fit it into the framework of "constructive"
realization. In the usual case in which the value of the property exceeds the amount of
the lien, it is always possible to treat the transaction as though the taxpayer received
the full amount and used part of those proceeds to pay off the loan, On that view, the
full value of the property is realized on the transaction, while the repayment of the debt
provides no deduction. See, e.g., Simms v. Comm'r, 28 B.T.A. 988, 1030 (1933). But that
rationale cannot be adopted where the property does not cover the amount of the lien.
Nonetheless, the taxpayer should be taxed, even under Crane, on the full amount of the
unpaid balance of the mortgage. In effect, he has received depreciation deductions at the
outset which have exceeded the amortization of the loan. Even though he has "realized"
nothing reducible to his possession or control, it is nonetheless only proper that he bring
his accounts into balance when the property is surrendered, because there will be no
convenient time in the future to set matters correct, See Adams, Exploring the Outer
Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAx L. REv.
159 (1966), where the point is made quite well by the Chief Justice, when he says:
If we were correct in allowing the mortgage to become a part of the taxpayer's
basis in the first place when he is not personally liable, are we not equally warranted in saying that he should be charged with the gain attributable to the use
of this basis when the property is disposed of and the transaction is closed?
This question must be answered in the affirmative. By doing so we rid ourselves with one clean stroke of the Pnfortunate shackles which the reasoning in
Crane imposed upon us. No longer are we required to say that the taxpayer has
realized an economic benefit when the mortgage on which he was not liable
follows the property into the hands pf its new owner. We find ourselves on firmer
ground when we say that the taxpayer's economic benefit stems from the deductions which we have allowed him to take on the ilnassumed mortgage. These
deductions arose by reason of the tax law and not because of what the taxpayer
paid for the property. Hence, when the property is disposed of-whether by sale,
abandonment, charitable gift, or otherwise-the tax law must be interpreted as
requiring the taxpayer to account for these deductions,
Id. at 169-70. Similarly, when Mr, Justice Magruder invokes the concept of negative basis
in Parker v. Delany, 186 F.2d 455, 459-60 (1st Cir. 1950) (concurring opinion), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 926 (1951), he has only attempted to make the taxpayer take back into income
the $31,000 difference between the amount of depredation taken by the taxpayer (approximately $45,000) and the amortization of the loan (approximately $14,000). The
difficulty with the negative basis is a theoretical one: a taxpayer should not be allowed
to take depreciation where he has no investment, and hence no basis. Moreover, even if
the taxpayer were entitled to depreciation, there is no way, given the rationale of Justice
Magruder, to decide that the appropriate amount of depreciation is $45,000. That figure
can be determined only if the loan is treated as part of the cost, which Justice Magruder
was not prepared to allow. See generally Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HAv. L. REV. 1852

(1962).
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Where the property in question is non-depreciable, the Cranerule
has little practical significance; it only requires that both the cost and
the amount realized on any piece of property be increased by the same
amount. 6 Where the balance of the loan remains constant over the
period for which the property is held, the very same figure must be
added to both the cost of the property and the amount realized upon
its disposition. Where part of the loan is paid off before disposition
the calculations are only slightly more complicated. Even though the
balance of the note is reduced, the taxpayer will nonetheless realize the
same amount on disposition because the decrease in the balance of the
mortgage will be offset by an increase in the amount of the boot he
receives.7 Hence in all cases, the tax treatment of non-depreciable property remains the same whether or not the Crane rule is adopted. However, if the property in question is depreciable, the impact of the Crane
rule is immense. Under the Internal Revenue Code the initial basis for
depreciation is cost.8 Where a taxpayer is permitted to include borrowed
capital in his cost basis, whether or not secured by real property, he
will be able from the outset to increase the amount of his depreciation
deductions. An individual taxpayer will be able to claim the benefit of
these deductions even where he is under no personal liability to repay
a loan, e.g., one secured only by a lien on the specific property of the
taxpayer. Moreover, given the enlarged cost basis, the benefits in the
early years of accelerated depreciation are accordingly increased 0
The unattractive features of the Crane rule reveal themselves, if
at all, upon the ultimate disposition of the property. At that time, the
taxpayer will be required to treat as part of his "amount realized" the
6. See Note, Tax Consequences of the Disposition of Property Subject to an Unassumed Mortgage, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 845 (1949).
7. For example, assume that the original loan was $100.00 and total purchase price
$150.00. If the taxpayer pays off $20.00 of the loan before he sells, say, for $175.00, then
his boot upon disposition will be $95.00 ($175.00 less $80.00). If no portion of the mortgage is paid off, then there is only $75.00 in boot ($175.00 less $100.00), but the gain is
still $25.00. Moreover, the results upon sale would be the same even if both amount
realized and cost were computed on the taxpayer's actual contributions to equity. Thus,
where $20.00 of the loan is paid off, the amount realized would be $95.00 (the boot), and
the cost $70.00, yielding a gain of $25.00. If no payment of principle has been made, then
both boot and cost are reduced by $20.00. Their difference still yields a gain of $25.00.

8. I.R.C. § 1012.
9. Under the recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, the opportunity for
accelerated depreciation has been reduced, for depreciation can be taken on 200% of the
declining balance only in the case of new residential rental property. I.R.C. §§ 167(b)(2),
1676)(2)(A). Section 1670)(1)(B) restricts the taxpayer to 150% of declining balance in
all other § 1250 property. With used residential property, only 125% of the declining
balance is allowed under I.R.C. § 167(j)(5)(B).
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unpaid balance of the mortgage. Since his adjusted basis has been substantially reduced by the depreciation deductions, usually to the point
where it is much less than the unpaid balance of the mortgage, it follows that the taxpayer will at that point in time have taxable income
in excess of the cash (or property in lieu thereof) which he actually receives upon disposition.1 Nonetheless, even the taxpayer faced with
this unhappy prospect at the time of disposition has much to console
him. First, the tax may well be imposed years after the depreciation
deductions were allowed, giving him in effect interest-free use of the
money during the intermediate period. Secondly, upon sale he will
have capital gain, except to the extent that the recapture rules require
him to treat all or part of the gain attributable to the recapture of accelerated depreciation as ordinary income.1 Again, the taxpayer may
be able to shelter much of the gain recognized upon sale by reinvesting
his proceeds in other real estate projects. 1 2 Finally, if the original taxpayer dies before realization, his heir or devisee enjoy the costless step13
up in basis provided for under Section 1014 of the Code.
Therefore, the Crane rule provides substantial tax benefits to individual taxpayers because it allows them, at the front end, a tax basis
greater than their economic investment would warrant.' 4 The rationale
behind the Crane rule, however, remains unclear even if most of its
consequences have been worked out. On the one hand it is said that
an alternative rule would require taxpayers to compute, at great ad10. In Crane, the taxpayer had only $2,500 in hand at the end of the transaction,
but was taxed on over $23,000. 331 U.S. at 3-4.
11. See I.R.C. § 1250. Again, the recent amendments to the Code have reduced to
some extent the degree of shelter, because the taxpayer must now wait for 100 months
(and not 20) before he can begin to exclude a portion of the accelerated depreciation
from recapture. I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(C)(iii)-(iv).
12. Like-kind transactions do not enable a taxpayer to postpone recognition of all
of his gain if the property acquired is raw land suitable for further development because
the mortgage placed on the property is treated as boot, and hence recognized at the time
of exchange unless the taxpayer assumes some liabilities of the transferee as part of the
exchange. I.R.C. § 1031; Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2 example (2) (1956).
Moreover, even where there is no mortgage upon the improvement, there will in
many cases be recapture on acceleratd depreciation in a like-kind exchange. The regulations require the recapture of accelerated depredation where the taxpayer does not receive
§ 1250 property in the exchange. Even if no boot is received, the Code does not allow the
taxpayer to defer recapture until the property acquired in a § 1031 exchange is disposed
of in a recognition transaction. I.R.C. § 1250(d)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-3(d) (1971).
13. I.R.C. § 1014.
14. Here the basis to the heir or devisee is equal to the fair market value of the
property, not reduced by a mortgage still upon it. See 331 U.S. at 6-8. The taxpayer here
is not hurt under the estate tax, because he is allowed to deduct in the computation of
his net estate the amount of the lien. I.R.C. § 2053(a)(4); 331 U.S. at 7.
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ministrative inconvenience, their depreciation deductions for each year
only after they take into account the increase in equity attributable to
the amortization of the loan. 15 But even if the administrative difficulties
arising from the use of a "shifting" equity were substantial, other alternatives to the Crane rule could be adopted to reduce, though not to
eliminate, the disparity between the legal and the economic consequences. For example, it is possible to compute depreciation deductions
throughout solely by reference to the taxpayer's initial investment. 10
In each future year he will not be required to take into income those
receipts which he applies to the amortization of the loan, but neither
will he be able to increase his basis in order to reflect the increase in
his investment. In effect, such a scheme declares that the taxpayer will
be bound and entitled to assign a one-year useful life to that portion
of his investment attributable to the amortization of the loan, even
though its useful life in economic terms is much greater. Here the taxpayer still enjoys some timing benefits, but not to the extent that they
are available to him under Crane.
It is also argued in support of the Crane rule that it would be unfair to limit depreciation to the taxpayer's equity because the actual
wear and tear to the structure is far in excess of that amount.x But
depreciation on the economic cost of the structure would be permitted
if the taxpayer took the amount of the loan into income at the outset
of the transaction. Here the restriction of the depreciation deductions
to invested equity would reflect only the same policy followed elsewhere
in the Code. For example, Section 109 of the Code provides that a taxpayer does not take into income at the termination of the lease the fair
market value of an improvement erected at his lessee's expense.', But
under Section 1019 he must accept a zero basis for the improvement,
even though its economic value is much greater. 10 In each subsequent
year the taxpayer cannot take into account depreciation for the eco15. 331 U.S. at 10. See generally Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized under Crane:
A Current View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. Ray. 69, 72-73

(1969).
16. Note, supra note 6, at 851: Del Cotto, supra note 15, at 98-99.
17. Under these provisions, if the mortgagor's equity were the § 113(a) [I.R.C.
§ 1014(a)] basis, it would also be the original basis from which depreciation allowances are deducted. If it is, and if the amount of the annual allowances were
to be computed on that value, as would then seem to be required, they will
represent only a fraction of the cost of the corresponding physical exhaustion,
and any recoupment by the mortgagor of the remainder of that cost can be affected only by the reduction of his taxable gain in the year of sale.
313 U.S. at 9 (footnotes omitted). See also Del Cotto, supra note 15, at 72.
18. I.R.C. § 109.
19. I.R.C. § 1019.
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nomic wear and tear because the forebearance in the collection of tax
at some earlier point is made on condition that the taxpayer forego,
pro tanto, an increase in basis. Similarly, where a structure greatly appreciates in value, a taxpayer must still calculate his depreciation deductions by reference to basis and not value since he did not take that
appreciation into income because of the realization requirement. In
the classic Crane situation, the depreciation of the borrowed capital
could well be denied for the same reasons that it is denied in the two
cases discussed above: depreciation should be allowed on invested capital only after it has been taken into income, and not before.
I. APPLICATION OF CRANE TO
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
A. TIHE PROBLEM
Thus far we have examined the general Crane doctrine. Even if its rationale is unsatisfactory, its benefits are now available to an individual
taxpayer who uses borrowed money for his real estate investments. For
the rest of this paper, the soundness of the rule will be assumed in order
to examine its application to situations in which limited partnerships
have received the loans in order to acquire depreciable property, Once
the loans are made to a partnership, the accounts for the partnership
and all the partners must be kept in order, even though the partner,
ship itself is not a taxpaying entity under the Internal Revenue Code.20
In the standard case of real estate development, each of the partners
contributes part of the cash necessary for the undertaking, but the bulk
of the construction costs are financed by a loan secured by a lien on
both the land and the structure. Under the influence of Crane, the
Code treats the loan to the partnership as a contribution to the partnership by one or another of its members. 21 The only issue of importance concerns the allocation among the partners of the increase in
basis attributable to the loan to the partnership. On the question of allocation, Section 752 of the Code provides that an increase in a partner's share of the liabilities of the partnership shall be treated as his
contribution to the partnership. The regulations in turn seek to amplify the basic statutory provisions. In the simplest case each of the
partners is personally liable for the partnership indebtedness. Under
those circumstances, the regulations provide that each partner is en20. Here it is assumed that there is no association for tax purposes under T.R.C.

§ 7701.
21. I.R.C. § 752.
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titled because of the loan to a pro rata increase in the basis of his partnership interest. 22 Again, if the loan is secured only by a lien on the
real estate, such that no partner is personally liable on the note, each
partner is then entitled to increase his basis in his partnership interest
23
by his pro rata share of the indebtedness.
It is, however, the hybrid case which causes the greatest concern.
If the loan agreement provides that only some partners shall be personally liable for repayment, then those partners must allocate among
themselves, pro rata, all the increase in basis, even if the loan is secured on partnership property in which all the partners have an interest. 24 This situation arises frequently with limited partnerships.
Assume, for example, that a limited partner makes a cash contribution
of $10.00 to a partnership. Assume further that the general partner,
who has made no contribution of either cash or property has procured
a loan of $100.00 secured by the partnership assets, for which he is personally liable. Under Regulation § 1.752-1(e), the limited partner has
a basis of $10.00 for his partnership interest, while the general partner
has a basis of $100.00. If the partnership uses the initial cash contributions by the limited partner to purchase the land, and the loan to
finance the purchase or construction of the improvement, the partnership's basis in the land will be $10.00 and its basis in the improvement
$100.00. Given the low basis of the limited partner's interest, much of
the depreciation allowable under the Crane rule may not be passed
through to the limited partner, because he is entitled to take into account his share of partnership losses only to the extent of the basis of
25
his interest.
In most real estate negotiations it is difficult to secure for the limited partners a step-up in basis by making them, along with the general partners, personally liable for the construction loans. Men who
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a) (1956).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
24. Id. § 1.752-1(e) provides that:
A partner's share of partnership liabilities shall be determined in accordance
with his ratio for sharing losses under the partnership agreement. In the case of
a limited partnership, a limited partner's share of partnership liabilities shall
not exceed the difference between his actual contribution credited to him by the
partnership and the total contribution which he is obligated to make under the
limited partnership agreement. However, where none of the partners have any

personal liability with respect to a partnership liability (as in the case of a mort-

gage on real estate acquired by the partnership without the assumption by the

partnership or any of the partners of any liability on the mortgage), then all
partners, including limited partners, shall be considered as sharing such liability
under section 752(c) in the same proportion as they share the profits.

25. I.R.C. § 704(d).
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become limited partners do so to keep the bulk of their wealth free
from the hazards of the particular enterprise. They are most unlikely
by a stroke of the pen to forsake the protection afforded them as limited
partners. Hence, as a practical matter, much of the benefit of the Crane
rule may be provided to limited partners only if there is no personal
liability for both the general and the limited partner, for only then
will each limited partner be entitled to his pro rata increase in basis.
But there may well be cases in which the lender is unwilling to make
the loan unless he has the assurance that someone of substance will be
personally liable on the note. In such a situation if the general partner
becomes personally liable the limited partners will, in effect, be sacrificing the step-up in the basis of their individual interests attributable
to the partnership indebtedness. It is therefore a matter of much practical concern and importance to examine Regulation § 1.752-1(e) to
determine whether it is proper, within the framework of the Crane
rule, to deny the limited partners a step-up in basis for partnership
indebtedness where the general partner alone is personally liable on
the note.
B.

REGULATION

§ 1.752-1(e)

1. The Argument from Principle
At the outset, the soundness of the Regulation is best examined in
light of the general rules for determining cost. It is settled that cash
actually paid by a taxpayer for the acquisition of an asset is properly
includible in his cost basis. Again, there is no real dispute that a taxpayer is entitled to include the fair market value of property surrendered as part of the cost basis of the asset acquired.2 6 Further, the Crane
rule itself suggests that indebtedness incurred in order to acquire an
asset also provides the taxpayer with a step-up in basis. But it is equally
well settled that not all obligations are includible in cost.27 Where obligations are contingent in nature and indefinite in amount they cannot be treated as a part of cost at the time they are incurred, even if
they are to be taken into account at some subsequent point in time
either as an increment to basis or as the source of an immediate deduction. The cases lend clear support to this proposition, and it is helpful
briefly to review them.
26. 3A MERTN's, LAw or FEDmzAL TAXATION ch. 21, § 21.10, at 31 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as MErTEN's].
27. Rev. Rul. 55-675, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 567. Security Flour Mills Co. v. Comm'r,
321 U.S. 281 (1944).
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In Albany CarWheel Co. v. Commissioner,8 the taxpayer acquired
the assets of a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of
chilled iron wheels. Under the terms of the purchase agreement, the
taxpayer agreed to pay his vendor $15,000 in cash and to assume approximately $75,000 of fixed obligations previously incurred by the
transferor. Both the Commissioner and the taxpayer agreed that both
of these items properly were treated as part of the taxpayer's cost. At
issue was the treatment of the taxpayer's contractual obligations towards his vendor's employees. These obligations required the taxpayer
to make severance payments to the employees it dismissed after it took
over the business. No severance pay was required for those employees
who left of their own accord, for those who died before employment
was terminated, or for those dismissed only after they received the notice required by contract. It was impossible to predict whether, and if
so to what extent, the taxpayer would be called upon to make payments
in order to honor these obligations. The Court held that these obliga,
tions could not be included as part of the cost of the assets because
they were, as it clearly seems, too indefinite and uncertain as to both
time and amount of payment.
The contingent nature of these obligations was highlighted by the
artificial method which the taxpayer used to estimate their extent in
determining his cost basis. It valued them at an amount equal to the
difference between the book value of the transferor's assets and the
amount received from their sale, claiming in effect that the fair market
value of those assets was precisely equal to their book value, a doubtful
assumption given the shaky condition of the chilled iron wheel industry, The proper treatment of such obligations, as indicated by the
Court, is to permit the taxpayer a deduction for these expenses if, as
and when they occur.2 9 At that later point in time, there could be no
problem in estimating their cost. They could be treated in the same
manner as all other business expenses under the rules that govern the
treatment of deductions for either accrual or cash basis taxpayers, as
the case may be, At stake, of course, was the time at which the taxpayer
could enjoy the tax benefits attributable to the economic burdens of
these obligations. If he were permitted to include them in basis at the
time they were incurred, then he could, once the proper allocation has
been made among assets, increase the extent of his depreciation deductions on the one hand, and the cost of goods sold on the other, But
28. 40 T.C. 831 (1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964).
29. Id. at 841.
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once these obligations are not taken into account in determining cost,
they can generate a tax benefit in the form of a business deduction only
when the passage of events removes their contingencies and converts
them to fixed obligations. 30
Similar issues are also raised in Walter Hoblitzell31 There the taxpayer purchased his father's interest in an automobile dealership in
which they were both partners. At the time of the purchase, the taxpayer agreed to pay his father $20,000 at a time certain in the future,
if in the interim the father did not compete with the automobile dealership with which the son was associated. The taxpayer was to be released
from all his obligations under the contract if the father committed even
one act in breach of the promise he made not to compete in the son's
business. Before the period of the covenant had run, the taxpayer sold
his interest in the partnership and claimed that the $20,000 should be
included in his basis. The Court, on facts which are much stronger for
the taxpayer than those in Albany Wheel-for here the amount of the
cost was fixed-held that the $20,000 obligation on the covenant could
not be included in the basis since payment on the covenant was contingent upon the future conduct of the taxpayer's father. 29 Again, an
obligation can be included in basis only if it is regarded as fixed.
Lloyd H. Redford33 is the last of the cases to be mentioned on the
question of cost. There the taxpayer purchased land to develop and to
subdivide. Under the terms of the purchase he gave his vendor a prom30.

If in fact the taxpayer had been permitted to value the contingent obligations

as be wished, then at some future time he would have to make corrections, either to
income or to basis, where the initial estimate proved inaccurate, If the actual cost of the
obligations turns out less than expected, then the taxpayer must, once the contingency
is resolved, take into income an amount equal to the difference between the estimate and
the payment, or reduce basis by that amount. If, however, the initial estimate proved too

low, then a step up in basis or an immediate deduction would be in order.
31. 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 60-1330, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1197 (1960).
32. The court left unanswered how the eventual payments under the covenant
should be treated in later years. On the above analysis, the taxpayer should be entitled
to some tax benefit by virtue of the payments, since the contingent nature of the obligation
should determine only the time it is taken into account. Nonetheless under the current
Code it is possible that those payments would be treated as personal, living or family
expenses, on the grounds that they are not ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred for the conservation of property held for the production of income, as that phrase
was construed in United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). The Tax Court, however,
decided not to comment in the subsequent treatment of the question. 29 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 60-1338; 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1197 (1960). Perhaps if the taxpayer lost on his
claim for a deduction upon payment of the $20,000, he could persuade the service to
re-open the return for the year in which the sale took place.
33. 28 T.C. 773 (1957).
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issory note for $61,000 secured on the property and payable in all
events at a future time. There was no dispute that this note was part
of the cost of acquiring the land. In addition, the taxpayer gave a
second note which required him to pay his vendor a sum equal to the
lesser of $25,000 or one-half the profits, computed in a stipulated manner, derived from the resale of the land after its development. The taxpayer sold off part of the land so acquired and sought to include in his
cost basis the appropriate portion of the $25,000 covered by the second
note, even though the exact sum due between the taxpayer and his
vendor had not been settled in an accounting. The taxpayer used the
$25,000 figure because no accurate calculations of the amounts owing
could be made at that time if the alternate figure was used. In line with
the rationale of the two cases previously discussed, the Tax Court held
that the contingent nature of this obligation required that it not be
included in the taxpayer's cost of the land, leaving for later determination the proper treatment for any payments made on the second note.
These cases seem to fully support the conclusion that it is improper
to include contingent and uncertain obligations in cost. This principle
should apply with equal force to the area of partnership taxation, and,
if it does, then Regulation § 1.752-1(e) is open to serious question. In
the case of a mortgage with personal liability, the mortgagee has two
sources to look to for the satisfaction of the mortgage debt. In the first
place he may look to the personal assets of his debtor; in the second,
he may look to the property which serves as collateral under the terms
of the loan agreement. As a matter of general commercial practice,
most secured loans are made for an amount less than the fair market
value of the property used as the security. In the typical real estate
project, the partnership will receive a loan sufficient to cover the costs
of the improvement. But, as a condition of the loan, the partnership
will have to subject the land as well as the improvement to the lender's
lien. Even if the mortgagor with personal liability is a party with substantial assets, most mortgagees rest much more easily if the property
used to secure payment of the note has a value in excess of the outstanding balance on the loan. Indeed, in the successful (or even marginal)
real estate development there will never be a need for the mortgagee
to demand that those persons with personal liability make good out of
their own pockets the payments due on the note, for the rentals derived
from the operation of the project should be sufficient to cover the principal and interest due on the mortgage, even after expenses.
Under these circumstances, it is proper to treat the situation as
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though the primary obligation rests upon the property, leaving those
with personal liability subject only to contingent obligations. The situation is thus similar to that in which one person is liable for the payment of a debt which has been guaranteed by another. The uniform
rule is that if the guarantor is on a cash basis he cannot take a deduction for the debt unless he has paid it. Similarly, taxpayers on an accrual basis may only take deductions for debt when they come under
a fixed obligation to pay.3 4 The extension of the principle to cases of
mortgages secured on partnership property for which only some partners are personally liable is clear in theory. There is every expectation
at the outset that the income derived from the operation of the partnership assets will be sufficient to make the payments on the loan. The
personal liability of some of the partners should be treated therefore
as though they were contingent obligations, subject to the general rules
that govern these obligations. 35 Where the existence and not the allo34. "Where the taxpayer is on the cash basis he will not be permitted a deduction
for loss upon a contract of guaranty until he actually makes payment under the guaranty." 5 MERTEN'S, supra note 26, at ch. 28, § 28.70, at 355 (1969). Accord, Robert S.
Farrell, 44 B.T.A. 238, 240-41 (1941). "Taxpayers on the accrual basis may take losses

when a liability is definitely established, even though there has been no actual payment."
Id. at ch. 28, § 28.71, at 356. Though the sentence does not make it explicit, it appears
that these remarks apply with full force to obligations incurred on a contract of guarantee.
85. Here, the private law of mortgages also uses the language of primary and secondary liability and principal and surety in the closely analogous situation where a
mortgagor, personally liable on the mortgage, tranfers the property to another person
who takes subject to the mortgage which he does not, however, assume. In this context,
it is said:
[W]hen the grantee merely takes subject to the mortgage, while it is true that
the grantee assumes no personal liability whatever, nevertheless the security in
his hands is liable for the payment of the mortgage debt, which liability as
between the grantee and the mortgagor is primary. Therefore, to the extent of
the value of such security property applicable to the mortgage debt, the original mortgagor and the grantee subject to the mortgage stand in a relation one to
another, which, while not a true suretyship, is nevertheless equitably analogous
thereto and subject to the operation of the same principles.
Zastrow v. Knight 56 S.D. 554, 566, 229 N.W. 925, 930 (1930). Or, in more cryptic form,

"....

the land is the principal and the transferor is only in the position of a surety or

one secondarily liable." G. OSBORNE, 1IANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF MORTGAGES 700 (1951)

(footnote omitted). These statements are restricted to cases where property is transferred
after the creation of the mortgage only because the point in issue is the continued liability
of the original mortgagor for the debt after the mortgagee forbears on the collection of
the debt from the transferee. That issue cannot arise where a partnership is still in possession on the original mortgage because there is no question of third party rights at all.
Nonetheless, the language of principal and surety describes, in an economic sense, the
relationship of a party personally liable on the mortgage to the property used as
security. Indeed, the application of this equitable notion of suretyship to the tax problems at hand is exact when the general partner, personally liable on the mortgage,
transfers the property subject to the mortgage to the partnership, provided that the
general partner and the partnership are treated as distinct legal persons, even in the
face of the step-transaction doctrine.
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cation of contingent obligations is in issue there is no question that the
Commissioner would argue, and with success, that the contingent ob.
ligations play no role in the determination of basis, even if they may
have to be taken into account at some other time. The same result
should follow here.
The situation under consideration here is in reality little different
from one in which the loan agreement requires the lender as a matter
of contract to look first to the partnership property for repayment, and
then to the personal assets of the general partner only if that property
is insufficient to satisfy the debt. Under those circumstances, the contingent nature of the personal obligations is made explicit by the terms
of the loan agreement. Even if that relationship is not made explicit
by contract, it is nonetheless the invariable practice to repay the loan
from the personal assets of the general partner only if the revenues
generated from the partnership property are insufficient to discharge
them. There is no express provision 0f the Regulation which covers
the situation where the lender is required by contract to look first to
the partnership assets for the repayment of the loan. Accordingly, that
situation should be governed by the principles derived from Crane and
Albany Wheel, which means that the allocation of basis among the partners on account of the loan should be made at the outset without regard to the personal obligations-here expressly contingent-of the
general partner. It is hard to believe that a radical readjustment of
basis in accordance with the mandate of Regulation § 1.752-1(e) should
be required in the typical case where the personal liability of the general partner remains contingent in fact even if it is no longer contingent
in form. There is no reason why such minute differences in the economic position should produce such divergent tax consequences, If the
analysis of contingent obligations is sound, then the regulation is not.
Thus far it has been argued that a limited partner should be entitled to his pro rata increase in the basis for his interest when the general partner alone is personally liable to repay the loan secured on the
partnership assets. But even if the limited partner is initially allowed
his pro rata share of the increase in basis, he may not be able to retain
his benefit in full in all events. Assume, for example, that contrary to
general expectations, the real estate subject to the mortgage does not
in any given year provide enough cash to satisfy the mortgage obligations, requiring the general partner to make out-of-pocket payments
to honor the partnership obligatiois. Once that contingency has oc-
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curred, each partner must readjust the basis of his interest. The general partner must increase the basis in his partnership interest by an
amount equal to that portion of his out-of-pocket payment used to discharge that part of the partnership indebtedness initially treated as the
limited partner's contribution to capital under Section 752 of the Code.
Similarly, the limited partner must reduce the basis in his partnership
interest by the same amount since neither his personal assets nor his
interest in the partnership property have generated the funds necessary to pay off that portion of the partnership indebtedness which was
initially treated as hig capital contribution. The discharge of the limited partner's portion of the indebtedness by the general partner is
thus treated as a return of capital to the limited partner. Indeed, if
the portion of the indebtedness initially assignable to the limited partner and subsequently discharged by his general partner exceeds (after
the pass-through of partnership losses to the limited partner in prior
years) the basis which the limited partner has in his interest, then the
limited partner should be required to take the difference between those
two figures into income, for otherwise he will be permitted over the
life of the partnership to take net losses in excess of his actual investment.
To illustrate this point, consider again the case in which a limited
partner makes a $10.00 cash contribution to a partnership, and in
which the general partner signs for a $100.00 loan, secured by the partnership assets. Assume that the partners have agreed on an equal division of profits and losses. If the Regulations are disregarded in light of
the arguments just made, the limited partner should have at the outset a basis of $60.00 for his interest, and the general partner one of
$50.00. Assume, further, that after the partnership has been in operation for two years, the general partner is required to make out of his
personal assets a payment of $10.00 on the note. If the basis of the limited partner were at that time $40.00 (after adjustments for the pass
through of his share of partnership losses), and that of the general were
$30.00, then after payment the limited partner's basis must be reduced
to $35.00 and the general partner's increased to $35.00, because $5.00
(or one-half of the payment) must be regarded as made in discharge of
obligations originally attributed to the limited partner in order to allow him his initial step-up in basis from $10.00 to $60,00. If, in the
alternative, the general partner had made from his personal assets a
payment of $90.00 on the note, then the limited partner would have a
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zero basis and $5.00 in income, while the general's basis would be increased by $45.00 to $75.00.36 Thus once the contingencies have been
resolved it is possible to make all the necessary adjustments to income

and basis to reflect the actual economic contributions to the partnership. There is no need to take into account the prospect of future failure when the partnership is created, particularly if remote and
uncertain.
2. The Cases

The arguments from principle thus far advanced suggest that contingent personal liability should be ignored at the outset in the allocation
of increases in basis attributable to secured loans to a partnership.
There have been only a few official decisions on the question, and
these do not reveal any consistent approach to the problem. Manuel
v. Mayerson37 is of interest because of its discussion on non-recourse
loans to a taxpayer. There the taxpayer paid $10,000 down in cash to
purchase real estate worth in excess of $300,000. The remainder of the
purchase price had to be paid within the next 99 years. Until paid,
the taxpayer was required to make interest payments on the outstanding balance of the loan which was secured by a non-recourse mortgage
on the property. The question before the tax court was whether the
taxpayer could claim the benefits of the Crane doctrine in the computation of his depreciation. 8 The Commissioner argued that the trans36. In the alternative, it is possible to treat the limited partner as though he received no income when the general partner made the payment on the loan, if the limited
partner receives a negative basis for his interest, here of - $5.00. See note 5 supra. Note,
once the general partner is required to make out-of-pocket payments on the loan, it is
possible that the initial division of profits and losses would no longer apply, either reducing or eliminating the limited partner's share of future depredation deductions.
37. 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
38. The Commissioner might have argued as well that the mortgage loan could not
be included in cost on the grounds that it created only contingent obligations to pay.
See Del Cotto, supra note 15, at 79-82. But that argument succeeds only if the courts
extend the concept of contingent obligations beyond its current limits in a manner inconsistent with the decision in Crane. In all cases considered in the text, the form of the
obligation was critical, and in all it was conditional. The severance payments in Albany
Car were due, as a matter of contract, if men were dismissed under conditions; the payments on the covenant not to compete were due in Hoblizell only if covenantor conformed
to certain contractual conditions; payments under the second note in Redford were due
only if the improved property, when sold, yielded a certain profit. In Mayerson the obligation to pay is contingent only in the sense that the taxpayer might choose at some
point to breach it. But in that sense most obligations are contingent, even if a taxpayer
is subject to personal liability, because there is always the prospect that creditor will not
receive payment in full in the ordinary course of business. Nonetheless, the possibility of
breach is usually disregarded until it has occurred. Similarly, the scope and nature of the
creditor's remedies should not be taken into account in determining whether an obiga-
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action in effect was a lease coupled with an option to purchase because
the taxpayer was not obligated to pay off the principal on the loan for
99 years. Under this interpretation the taxpayer could only amortize
the $10,000 down payment over the life of the lease.39 The Court, however, rejected this contention on the grounds that the Commissioner
had to respect the taxpayer's characterization of the transaction as a
sale because it represented an arm's length transaction between strangers. In the course of its opinion, the Court commented on the Commissioner's further contention that the transaction had to be regarded
as a sham because the taxpayer was not personally liable for the payment of the loan.
The element of the lack of personal liability has little real significance due to common business practices. As we have indicated
in our findings it is not at all unusual in current mortgage financing of income-producing properties to limit liability to the property involved. Taxpayers who are not personally liable for encumbrances on property should be allowed depreciation deductions
affording competitive equality with taxpayers who are personally
liable for encumbrances or taxpayers who own unencumbered
property. The effect of such a policy is to give the taxpayer an advance credit for the amount of the mortgage. This appears to be
reasonable since it can be assumed that a capital investment in the
amount of the mortgage will eventually occur despite the absence
of personal liability. 40
tion is contingent. See Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1946), where the mortgage was not
treated as a contingent obligation even though there was no personal liability. Both Crane
and Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950) are cases where the mortgage was not
treated as a contingent liability, even though the debtors were not personally liable in
either case. See, e.g., Estate of McNichol v. Conm'r, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), for
another situation in which the want of an effective remedy was not decisive for tax
purposes. There the taxpayer was held to have retained a life estate under Section 2036
of the Code, even though he had no action to enforce his right to the property because
of the operation of the Statute of Frauds.
59. Under this interpretation, it is not quite clear how subsequent payments on the
mortgage should be treated. It could be argued that all of those payments should be
treated as rent, regardless of when made, and hence deductible as paid. But if a large
portion of the principal of the loan is paid in a given year, it might be proper to treat it
either as a prepayment of rent and require the taxpayer to write it off only over a
period of years, or, under other circumstances, as a delayed payment of rent to be deducted when paid. In any case, it seems odd that the tax treatment of rentals on a 99
year lease should so differ from mortgage payments on the fee, when the value of the
revision is so negligible. But despite the kinship between the mortgage of the fee and the
lease for a long term of years, the precedents in the former area are not carried over to
the latter.
40. 47 T.C. at 351-52.
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It is hard to see why these remarks do not apply with equal force
to the case where only one member of a partnership is liable on a note
secured by the partnership property. Nonetheless, Curtis W. Kingbay4'
decided shortly before Mayerson, makes it clear that the Tax Court
relies more on specific Regulations than upon principle in assessing
the role of personal liability in cases of secured loans made to partnerships. In Kingbay, the taxpayer and his wife created a limited partnership in which they were the only limited partners. The general
partner was his wholly owned corporation with a net worth, apart from
its interest in the real estate, of about $1,000.00. The partnership received several substantial loans for the construction of the real estate
secured on its assets, for which the corporate general partner alone was
personally liable.4 For the tax years in question, the taxpayer sought
to take his pro rata share of the partnership losses on his individual
tax return. These losses were disallowed, in part, by the Commissioner
on the grounds that the taxpayer's basis in his partnership interest had
to be determined solely by reference to his initial capital contributions.
The court accepted the contention of the Commissioner that Regulation §. 1.752-1(e) required all of the basis in respect to that debt to be
allocated to the corporate partner since it alone was liable on the note,
although the corporate dummy did not have any assets apart from its
interest in the real estate partnership. Thus, the decision in Kingbay
appears to stand for the proposition that the security will be disregarded
in the allocation of basis, and that the note will be given paramount
importance even where the former is of crucial business importance
and the latter is quite immaterial.
The proper response to the problems raised by Kingbay has been
indicated earlier in the article. The taxpayer should be allowed to
claim his pro rata portion of the debt as ail addition to the basis.
Should corporate funds not derived from the real estate venture be
used to reduce that debt, then the appropriate adjustments to income
43
and basis can be made at that time in the matter previously described.
41.

46 T.C. 147 (1966).

42. The opinion does not state why the taxpayer chose, as a business matter, to
adopt this form of transaction given the adverse tax consequences. It is quite possible,

however, that he did So because of the impact of a state Regulation rule which required
some person to be personally liable before a secured loan could be made.
It would be harsh indeed if the use of the dummy to comply with state law had an
adverse impact on the tax position of the limited partners, but as a matter of planning,
one must always be aware of the collateral consequences that can follow from compliance
with state law, however unwise it may be.
43. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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Should there be a default upon the loan which requires repossession
by the lender, then the taxpayer should have at that time income to
the extent that his depreciation deductions exceed his contributions
to equity.44 But under no circumstances does it make any sense to have
the allocation of basis follow the personal liability of the corporate
dummy.
The arguments made thus far are designed to show the weakness
in principle of Regulation § 1.752-1(e). But even if unsound, the Com4
missioner has sought to expand its scope in Revenue Ruling 69-223. 5
There, a limited partnership was formed with one limited and one
general partner. The general partner was personally liable on the real
estate mortgage assumed by the partnership. The limited partner, however, agreed in effect to indemnify the general partner for his pro rata
share of the partnership losses if the general partner had to use his
personal assets to satisfy the mortgage. Given these facts, the Commissioner ruled that the limited partner was entitled to no increase in the
basis of his partnership interest on account of the mortgage, holding
that his contractual duty to indemnify the general partner for his pro
rata share of the losses could not be treated as a contribution to the
partnership." Hence the general partner received an increase in his
basis for the full amount of the mortgage.
The position taken by the Commissioner in the Revenue Ruling
does not seem to be in accordance with the general principles governing contingent obligations already discussed. In the first place, all the
arguments used to attack Regulation § 1.752-1(e) apply with equal
force to this case, for it is still proper to treat the liability of the general partner as contingent upon the inability of the partnership assets
to satisfy the partnership debts. 4 7 Moreover, the position of the Commissioner is further weakened by the presence of the pro rata indemnity agreement, which makes it even more unlikely that the general
partner's personal assets alone will be used to discharge the obligation
to the lender. Here there is not only the condition precedent that the
revenues from the partnership property are insufficient to cover the
loan, but also the condition subsequent that the general partner is un44. Parker v. Delany, 186 F.2d 455 (Ist Cir. 1950).
45. Rev. Rul. 69-223, 1969- Cum,. BuLL. 184 (1969).
46. Id. at 184-85. Here it is not quite clear why the limited partner could not claim
the benefits of the step-transaction doctrine in order to make his obligation to indemnify
in effect a contribution to the partnership, even though one that must pass through the
hand of the general partner.
47. See text accompanying notes 83-35 supra.
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able to recover the pro rata share of his loss from the limited partner
by suing on the indemnity agreement. Thus if the arguments made
earlier based upon the proper tax treatment of contingent obligations
are sound, it follows that the case for the taxpayer is stronger given the
facts of Revenue Ruling 69-223 than it is when the general partner,
without benefit of the indemnity, is liable on a note secured by partnership assets.
This argument can be set firmly into framework of the general
tax law by an examination of the rules which govern bad debt deductions. These rules provide that a guarantor cannot take a deduction
for payments on the guarantee unless he can show that his action over
against the primary obligor is worthless.4 Here, in effect, the general
partner, by virtue of the indemnity agreement, has a position analogous
to a guarantor. True, the limited partner is not in the exact position of
a primary obligor. Nonetheless, it is to him that the general partner
is entitled to look for payment on the indemnity agreement in the
same fashion that a guarantor is entitled to look to a primary obligor.
It is immaterial that the rules governing guarantees apply in terms
only to cases of immediate deductions, while here an increase in the
basis of a partnership interest is the point in issue. The difference between an immediate deduction and an increase in basis only determines the time when a taxpayer receives his tax benefit. It should not
determine which taxpayer receives the benefit. Unless it can be shown
that the action on the contract is worthless to the general partner, the
limited partner should receive his pro rata portion of tax benefits under Section 752 on the grounds that he is the person most likely, all
things considered, to bear in due course the economic burden which
generated that portion of the tax benefit in the first instance.
The matter can be put in a slightly different way. There is no
doubt that the limited partner would receive his pro rata increase in
basis if he too were personally liable on the mortgage. Yet the situation
described in Revenue Ruling 69-223 differs only in certain limited respects from one in which both partners are jointly liable on the mortgage. Under most circumstances the exposure of the limited partner
will approach that of the general partner, even though the limited
48. "Where the guarantor pays the debt pursuant to his contract, he cannot per se
deduct the debt, but rather must show that he is unable to collect the debt from the
primary debtor." 5 MERTEN'S, supra note 26, at ch. 30, § 30.52, at 119 (footnotes omitted).
See also Morris Sass, 7 B.T.A. 557 (1927). aff'd on rehearing,17 B.T.A. 261 (1929); Otto P.
Heyn, 4 B.T.A. 1256 (1926).
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partner may enjoy some protection because he has no direct relationship with the lender. True, the limited partner, if he does not sign on
the loan to the partnership, cannot be liable for the entire partnership
debt even if the partnership assets are worthless and the general partner bankrupt. The general partner is, of course, subject to such liability if the partnership assets are worthless and the limited partner
bankrupt. Moreover, if the indemnity agreement between the partners
serves to protect the limited partner against direct actions by partnership creditors, then the limited partner by virtue of the indemnity can
be held liable only for the pro rata share of the loss actually suffered
by the general partner.49 For example, if the general partner is forced
to pay $50.00 from his own pocket in order to discharge the loan obligations, his indemnity will net him $25.00 if the partners agreed to an
equal division of profits and losses. Only where the limited partner
proves unable to pay the $25.00 will there be any need for further
basis adjustments, and those can be made in precisely the same manner
discussed earlier in this article: 5 0 the general partner increases his basis
by $25.00 while the limited partner reduces the basis of his interest by
$25.00.
These arguments suggest that it is incorrect to allocate initially all
of the increase in basis attributable to the loan to the general partner's
interest, even where there is only an indemnity agreement covering
partnership losses, for that agreement suggests that, in the ordinary
course of events, the cost of the loan will be shared pro rata by the two
partners. This conclusion holds even when no partnership property is
used to secure the loan. The arguments made earlier suggest that it is
also incorrect to allocate all of this increase in basis to the general
partner's interest when partnership property is in fact used to secure
the loan, even if the general partner has no right of indemnification
against his limited. Revenue Ruling 69-223 presents a situation in
which the personal liability of the general partner is limited by both a
security arrangement and an indemnity agreement. The combined
effect of these two forms of protection suggest that if Regulation
§ 1.752-1(e) is unsound, then, a fortiori, the limited partner should
49. It is quite possible that under state law, a creditor of the general partner will be
able to claim as an involuntary assignee or subrogee, all the rights of the contract of indemnification, even in the face of language that seeks to deny him those rights. For
example, it is stated that: "[t]he fact that a contract contains an express cause against
assignability will not prevent the clause of action from vesting in the trustee." 4a CoLL ER,
ON BANKRUPTCy § 70.28, at 408-09 (14th ed. 1969). See also Bankruptcy Act § 70a (5)-(6),
11 U.S.C. § 110 (1964).
50. See pages 112-14 supra.
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in this case as well share equally at the outset in the increase in basis
to the partnership interests attributable to the loan.
3. Guaranteesof Completion
The principles already developed may be used to analyze the tax consequences of a guarantee of completion, In many cases, the general partner may guarantee the lender that he will complete the construction of
the proposed project even if the funds advanced by the lender to the
partnership prove insufficient for the task. A guarantee of completion
differs from personal liability on the note because once the project is
completed, the lender will be able to look only to the rentals derived
from its operation for satisfaction of the loan. The personal assets of the
general partner are beyond his reach in case of its financial failure after
completion.
There is no definitive statement as yet on the tax treatment of an
obligation to complete. Nonetheless, it does not seem proper to treat
the general partner as making a contribution to the partnership in
excess of his pro rata share of the indebtedness. It is hard to characterize
an obligation to complete as a debt, for it speaks in terms of indefinite
performance, and does not call for the payment of a sum certain at a
future time.51 There is no reason why Section 752 and the regulations
thereunder should require general partners to increase their basis at the
expense of the limiteds. That guarantee comes into play only if the
funds initially committed to the project are insufficient to complete it.
If the general partner makes additional contributions to the partnership
in order to complete the structure, then he will be entitled to the corresponding increase in basis. But this increase in basis represents only
an increase in the total investment in the project; it should not serve
to reduce the basis of the limited partners attributable to the original
loan. In effect, the guarantee of completion raises the question of the
relationship between basis and contingent obligations in the usual
case where the existence of basis and not its allocation is in issue. While
the obligation lies dormant, it generates no tax benefit. But once it is
settled that the general partner will have to make payments from his
own pocket to discharge the obligation to complete, then, but only
then, will he have the benefit of an addition to basis on his account.
The rule laid down in Albany Wheel thus applies with full force to the
2
case of the guarantee to complete.
51. The requirement of a fixed sum due at a fixed time deriveg from the medieval
actions in debt. See, C. FiFooT, HjisORy AND SOURCES OF THE CoMM oN LAiV, ToRT AWf

CoNTRAr 229 (1949).
52. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
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TAx CONSEQUENCES OF §

1.752-1(e)

UNDER CURRENT LAw

Thus far this article has attacked the Soundness in principle of Regulation § 1.752-1(e). Even if it is assumed that the Regulation pr6perly
interprets the law, there are still serious questions that must be answered. The Regulation only requires an initial allocation of basis
between the limited and the general partner; it does not indicate what
adjustments to basis should be made as the partnership over the years
amortizes the loan with the revenues derived from the operation of
the property.
There are, in principle, two possible treatments of the amortization
payments on the loan. In the first instance, they may serve to increase
the basis of the limited partner to the extent of his pro rata share of
those payments, and, at the same time, to reduce the basis of the general
partner by a like amount. Under such a view, the limited partner will
be entitled to take on his own individual return his share of the depreciation deductions taken in respect to the partnership improvement,
though he may not be able to do so in the year the losses are created.
On the other hand, the amortization payments could be treated as
providing the general partner's actual investment in the partnership
asset to justify, after the fact, the assignment to him of all the basis
attributable to the loan in the first instance. On this interpretation, the
limited partner will be able to take depreciation deductions attributable
to the partnership improvement only to the extent of his initial cash
investment, since none of the payments on the loan will be treated for
tax purposes as increasing his cash investment in the partnership. Both
these views must be examined in greater detail.
1. The first view: amortization requires reallocation
On the first possible view of the Regulation, basis adjustments should
be made to the interests of both the general and limited partner as the
loan is amortized. The Regulation in effect has assumed in its initial
assignment of basis that the general partner will, in the ordinary course
of events, provide all the cash necessary to pay off the loan when it
increased the basis in his interest by its full amount. If, as has already
been argued, a pro rata allocation of basis between the general and
limited partner is appropriate at the outset for loans to the partnership,
then readjustments in basis are required in principle when the general
partner is forced to make out-of-pocket payments to satisfy the loan
obligations. Here, when the Regulation assigns basis at the outset on the
assumption that the entire loan will be paid out of the personal assets
of the general partner (a much more unlikely assumption), then it also
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follows that basis readjustments must in principle be made as that
prediction is falsified by events. Accordingly, as the amortization payments are made from partnership revenues, the limited partner should
be allowed to increase the basis in his interest by his pro rata share of
the payments, since his actual investment in the partnership property
is increased by that amount. Similiarly, the basis of the general partner
must be reduced by an equal amount, because it is now clear that, to
the extent of the fresh contribution by the limited partner, the general
partner can no longer be expected to repay the entire loan.
On these assumptions, the rate of basis readjustment can be crucial
because the Code permits the pass through of losses to the individual
return in a given tax year only to the extent of a partner's basis in his
interest5 Some of those losses allocable under the terms of the partnership agreement to the limited partner therefore may have to be held in
suspense at the partnership level until his investment in the partnership
is increased at some subsequent time. Whether in any particular case
the limited partner will have losses attributable to him suspended at the
partnership level is a function of many variables: the ratio of equity to
debt; the amount of prepaid interest; the expected life of the structure;
the method used to take depreciation; the interest and the period of the
loan. Nonetheless it is possible to construct a case which requires the
suspension at the partnership level of losses allocable to the limited
partner, even on fairly modest assumptions.

These points can be illustrated by a case of a simple two-man
partnership. The limited partner contributes $10.00 in cash to the partnership; under the terms of the agreement he takes into account threefourths of the partnership's profits and losses. The general partner
makes no cash contribution to the partnership, but receives for his
efforts one-fourth of the partnership profits. Upon formation of the
partnership, the general partner extends his personal credit in order
to secure a loan for $108.00 to be secured on the partnership assets.
Under the terms of the loan, the first year's interest-for convenience
sake, say, $8.00-is to be prepaid. The loan is for a period of 15 years,
and is for eight per cent interest. Ten dollars of partnership funds are
used to purchase land, and the remaining $100.00 are used to erect an
apartment house with a 20 year useful life. The depreciation on the
structure is taken on the double declining balance method.
At the outset, Regulation 1.752-1(e) provides that the limited
3. I.R.C. f 704(d)
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partner will have a basis of $10.00 in his interest, and the general partner a basis of $100.00 in his. Once the deductions for the prepaid interest are taken into account, the limited partner's basis will be reduced
from $10.00 to $4.00 since he will be entitled to three-fourths of the
$8.00 deduction. In the first year in which the structure is completed,
the limited partner's share of the depreciation deductions should be
$7.50,54 while his share of the amortization of the loan should be about
$2.92.r, Hence, it follows that the amount of his depreciation deductions ($7.50) exceeds the basis of his partnership interest ($4.00) even
when augmented by his share of the amortization ($2.92). Under the
partnership provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the limited partner will be entitled to take a deduction on his individual return equal
to $6.92, leaving $0.58 worth of losses in suspense at the partnership
level. The amount of losses so held in suspense will increase as long
as the depreciation deductions exceed the amortization on the loan.
Only when the amortization payments exceed the depreciation will
those suspended deductions be passed through, bit by bit, to the limited
partner, until he receives his full share of the depreciation. At issue is
the question of timing, and here many years will pass between the time
the depreciation deduction was created and the time that the limited
partner takes it into account. Indeed, on the assumptions just given, the
limited partner will be able to reduce the amount of losses held in
suspense at the partnership level starting only in the seventh year of
operation,"6 while only in the twelfth year will there be no losses
allocable to the limited partner held in suspense at the partnership
57

level.

Moreover, the losses suspended in the partnership provide a
deferred tax benefit as well if the real estate in question is sold before
the mortgage has been discharged in full. Under those circumstances
the amount realized by the partnership will be determined, under
Crane, by adding the unpaid balance of the mortgage to the boot received by the partnership. The adjusted basis, of course, will be the
original cost of the partnership assets, including the borrowed funds,
54. RaLTY BLumoox 114 (rev. 3d ed. 1970).
55. Id. at 116.
56. Id. at 114, 116. In the seventh year the total depreciation is only $5.30, while
the total amortization is $6.27.
57. Id. at 114, 116. By the twelfth year the limited partner has had available, after
all increases attributable to his -portion of the amortization, about $56.50 in investment
to permit the pass through of depreciation deductions. His pro rata share of the depredation through the twelfth year is about $54.00. Hence, on the assumptions in the text,
there should be no more losses suspended at the partnership level after the twelfth year.
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as reduced by the amount of the depreciation deductions. The gain,
equal to the difference between these two figures, must be allocated in
accordance with the partnership agreement; hence, three-fourths of the
gain goes to the limited partner. Nonetheless, he will not be taxed on
his full share of the gain, because he can set off against that gain those
losses still suspended at the partnership level, Thus the sale operates as
a kind of instantaneous amortization which immediately permits the
pass through of all the suspended partnership losses. 5 8 If the property
is sold before the loan is repaid, the taxpayer still makes the requisite
investment; only now the investment is made because he is required to
take into income the unpaid balance of the mortgage.
Hence, whether the property be held or sold, the Regulations to
Section 752 require in effect the tax benefits from depreciation be
passed to the individual return only when there is satisfaction of the
loan. But the decision in Cranerejected the argument that depreciation
of borrowed capital should be deferred until satisfaction of the loan, at
least in the case of the individual taxpayer. It is not to the point here
to contend that the arguments in Crane are defective in principle. Once
it is settled that depreciation deductions should not be tied to the repayment of loans, that decision should govern partnership as well as individual property because the timing of these deductions should not be
a function of the form of the investment vehicle.
The reallocation of basis with amortization requires an examination of the tax consequences to the general partner as well. The individual taxpayer who does not enter into any partnership receives his
step up in basis because he is expected to make an investment equal to
his basis in the property over the life of the loan. In effect, he receives
at the outset the tax benefits from a cash investment expected to be
made in the future. In the case of the ordinary limited partnership, the
general partner cannot be expected to make contributions to the partnership in an amount equal to the basis in his interest as determined by
the Regulations. Consider again the case where the mortgage is for
$100.00, with one-fourth of the profits and losses allocable by agreement
to the general partner. Here only one-fourth the amortization of the
0 Seventy-five dollars in
loan, and no more, will be assignable to him.6
58. On sale, of course, Section 1231 should permit the gain to be capital, except to
the extent that recapture of the accelerated portion of the depreciation is required. I.R.C.
§1231. The losses presumably would be set off only against the portion of the gain which
would otherwise be subject to the tax under Section 1231.
59. See note 6, 7 supra.

60. -In this example, the question of prepaid interest is eliminated for simplicity.
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basis, therefore, cannot be attributed to the future investment of the
general partner, and only the most careful treatment of the basis in his
interest will here prevent $75.00 of his income from being treated as a
return of capital at some point in the future. Here the general partner
must be required to reduce the basis in his interest as the rental income
of the limited partner is used to repay the loan. Over the life of the
loan, then, the net effect of the regulations is to step up the general
partner's basis at the outset only to require it to be reduced at some
later point in time by an amount in excess of his pro rata share of the
partnership losses. That excess amount is, of course, equal to the
amortization payments available to the limited partner, for which he,
the limited, receives a step-up in basis. Thus, even if the general partner
received a basis of $25.00 at the outset, he could still receive all the
benefits of depreciation to which he was entitled under the agreement.
Moreover, the $25.00 basis figure for his share in the loan would not
alter the gain or loss recognized upon the sale of the property, for he is
not required to include the entire balance of the mortgage in his portion of the gain, three-fourths of which under the terms of the agreement goes to the limited partner.6 1
The initial assignment of the full $100.00 in basis to the general
partner, then, affects neither the ,amount of his depreciation deductions
nor his gain upon sale. In short, it never affects his tax position at any
point in time over the life of the project, unless his personal liability
is called into play. In the normal case, the sole impact of the assignment
of basis under the Regulation is to insure that the limited partner'iwill
not, on the question of timing, be able to derive the same benefits
under the Crane rule available to either general partners or individual
owners.
2. The second view: no reallocation upon amortization
The arguments just made appear to be sound in principle, but the
Commissioner might nonetheless argue that there should be no reallocation of basis from the general to the limited partner as the revenues
derived from the operation of the partnership property are used to
amortize the loan. As a corollary to this position, it follows that the
terms of the partnership agreement must be disregarded insofar as they
purport to govern the allocation of the partnership income used for
amortizing the loan, in order to insure that the general partner will
make an actual investment over the life of the loan equal to the increase
61.

See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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in basis awarded to him in the first instance. If this treatment is adopted
there is no need to reduce by fiat the basis of the general partner as the
loan is paid off. Similarly, the limited partner will be unable to increase
his basis on account of the amortization of the loan from partnership
revenues.
In effect the provisions of Regulation § 1.752-1(e) can be respected
over the life of the loan only if the Commissioner is prepared to override the allocation of profits and losses called for by the partnership
agreement. Moreover, once it is decided that the partnership income
applied to the amortization of the loan shall be assigned to the general
partner even in the face of the terms of the partnership agreement,
there will be a need to require the two partners to abandon as well the
pro rata allocation of depreciation deductions to which they agreed.
The limited partner will be able, on this view, to claim depreciation
deductions only to the extent of his initial cash investment.02 The general partner will then take all remaining depreciation deductions on the
structure. In effect, once Regulation § 1.752-1(e) is allowed to govern
all aspects of the transaction, all the borrowed funds allocable to the
improvement are treated as the investment of the general partner.
Moreover, since the cash contribution of the limited partner is allocated
to the improvement, the purchase price of the land in its entirety must
be attributed to the general partner's loan contribution.
These points can be clarified by an example. Consider again the
case where the limited partner contributes $10.00 to the partnership
and the general partner signed on a note for $100.00 secured on the
partnership assets. The partnership uses the funds to purchase land
worth $10.00 and an improvement worth $100.00. The limited partner
can take losses, including depreciation deductions up $10.00, under
the terms of the partnership agreement. But the general partner has
$90.00 in depreciation deductions over the life of the structure and
must take into income, on a different time schedule, the $90,00 in
project income used to amortize the loan. Once the loan is discharged
62. I.R.C. §§ 702, 704(c)(1). Here the limited partner could take his portion of the
depredation to the extent of his investment in the partnership. There is no way that the
Commissioner could argue that allocation under the partnership agreement should be
disregarded when the limited partner has a basis in his interest which permits the pass
through of at least some of the depreciation deductions. In effect, the Commissioner cannot demand that the partnAers proceed on the assumption that the limited partner con"tibuied the fuids allocable to the land, and the general partner those allocable to the
depreciable improvement.- See -Treas. Reg. -§ 1.704-1(c)(2) example 1 (1956), as amended,
T.D. 6771, 1964-2 Cum. Buu.. 177.
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and the amortization completed, the general partner will have a basis
of $10.00 in his interest equal to the basis of the land in the hands of
the partnership.
In the example just put, 90 percent of the timing benefits of the
Crane rule, under this interpretation, would inure to the benefit of
the general partner, leaving only 10 percent of these benefits for the
limited partner, whose depreciation deductions would be limited to his
initial $10.00 cash contribution. The limited partnership would have
little appeal as a tax shelter device for limited partners if this treatment
were required by the Commissioner and the Courts.0
But it is by no means clear that the Commissioner's powers under
current law are sufficient to enable him to disregard the terms of partnership agreement on the strength of § 1.752-1(e). The Internal Revenue Code provides that the partnership allocation of profits and losses is
entitled to respect for tax purposes unless it can be shown to be without
"substantial economic effecL"" The application of that term is difficult
even in the simplest of cases. Consider just one of the several examples
set out in the Regulations. Assume that a partnership agreement calls
for an equal division of partnership profits between each of two partners, but assigns the first $10,000 of tax-exempt income to one partner,
and an equal amount of taxable income to the other partner, with the
balance divided equally between them. In this case, no segregation of
profits by source would be required as a business matter if there were
no taxation of partnership income. Hence, in such a case it is possible
for the Commissioner to respect the percentage division of profits even
if he disregards the provisions which seek, solely for tax reasons, to
assign the first $10,000 from tax exempt securities to one of the partners.
In other words, it is possible to decide what the partners would have
done between themselves as an economic matter if there had been no
tax at all. If the partners elaborate their business arrangements in order
to satisfy tax needs, then the Commissioner can, under his statutory
authority, revise the agreement consistent with the business purpose of
the partnership. 65
In the case of real estate partnerships, however, the case for reallocation is much more difficult. Here, the Commissioner should not be
able to disregard the partnership agreement insofar as it governs the
63. Here it is assumed that the only losses passed through are due to depreciation.
64. I.R.C. § 704; Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6771, 1964-2

Cum. BuLL. 177.
65.

Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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taxation of spendable cash generated by the partnership operations.
The division of the cash flow is crucial to the business position of all of
the partners, and would remain so even if the income tax were repealed
on the morrow. But the Commissioner must argue that the partnership
allocation cannot be respected to the extent that it governs some of the
amortization payments made on the loan on the grounds that the allocation of income to be applied to the discharge of partnership obligations
is without substantial economic effect. But this argument proves too
much, because there is no alternative allocation of this income which
as an economic matter better captures the interests of the partners.

There is no way in which a business bargain can be reconstructed over
an issue on which the partners are economically indifferent. If there
were no federal income taxation, or a system, of taxation without the
Crane decision, the partners would have no concern whatsoever about
the allocation of those profits which had to be returned to the business.

Crane makes the issue of the allocation of income and depreciation
crucial only because the depreciation deduction is taken in advance of
the investment. But in the case of an immediate deduction, such as

that for interest, the issue of allocation is quite immaterial. If one partner received $100.00 in rental income and an immediate deduction for
$100.00, he is no better or worse off than another partner who receives
no income and who in consequence is entitled to no deduction.
In the case of the securities treated in the Regulations, there was a business standard to which the Commissioner could turn in order to reconstruct the partnership agreement. But in this case that standard is simply

unavailable. 66
66. Note, both interpretations of the regulation are, though to different degrees,
unfavorable to limited partners. Hence, there is a strong planning incentive to avoid the
application of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). For example, it has been suggested that
the general partner may purchase the real property in his own name, using, at least
in part, funds from a mortgage in which he is personally liable. Then, he could transfer
the property subject to the mortgage to the limited partnership, which does not, however,
assume it. But, here, the Commissioner no doubt would apply the step-transaction
doctrine, and hold that in substance the partnership acquired the property directly in a
transaction in which the general partner is personally liable on the mortgage. In an attempt to avoid the step-transaction doctrine, it has been suggested that, "if there are
two or more general partners, and only one of them has personal liability on the indebtedness, it cannot be said that the initial step involving only one general partner was all
form and no legal substance. It does make a difference of some significance whether one
general partner or all general partners have personal liability on the indebtedness." A.
WU.iS, ON PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 181-82 (1971). True, there is a difference, but not one
which should help the limited partners. In effect, the arrangement proposed (but by no
means warranted) should, if the Regulation is valid, require the one general partner to
step-up his basis for the full amount of the mortgage to the exclusion of the other, leaving the positions of the limiteds unchanged.
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There is one further obstacle that would stand in the path of the
Commissioner if he sought to disregard the partnership allocation of
profits and losses in the manner just indicated. The Regulations make it
clear that the Commissioner is entitled to disregard those special allocations contained in the partnership agreement which are designed to
avoid or minimize the tax. But once those special provisions are disregarded, the item which received special treatment must be allocated
in the manner generally provided for the treatment of profits and
losses.67 Here, the taxpayer would insist upon the application of the
general partnership provisions to both the project income applied
towards amortization and the depreciation deductions dependent upon
that allocation. But it would be the Commissioner who would seek to
disregard the general terms of the agreement. No case has yet been
decided on this question, but the language of the Regulations makes it
difficult to believe that the Commissioner would prevail if he tried to
argue that Regulation 1.752-1(e), even if valid, required anything more
that a postponement of the pass through of partnership losses to the
limited partner.
CONCLUSION
This article cannot claim to raise issues whose resolution carries with it
profound implications of social policy. Quite to the contrary, all of the
arguments contained in the text proceed on a technical footing, but
though technical, they would, if accepted by the courts, have a substantial import on the use of limited partnerships for real estate development. Once the Crane rule, with all of its implications, is used to
compute the cost of property acquired with borrowed funds, then it
follows as a matter of principle that the Commissioner's position in
Regulation § 1.752-1(e) and Revenue Ruling 69-223 cannot be supported. Given the generally accepted treatment of contingent obligations, the increase in the basis of partnership interests attributable to
the mortgage placed upon the real property should be allocated at the
In the alternative, however, it might be possible to both satisfy the lender and preserve the step-up in basis to the limited partners by providing that the general partners
are personally liable for the interest but not the principal due on the loan. In the early

years, when the danger of failure is greatest, the lender can look to the general partners'
personal assets for the bulk of the loan payments. Should the generals be required to make
out-of-pocket payments on the interest, they should be able to claim an immediate deduction under either Section 162 (business expenses) or Section 163 (interest) of the Code.
Moreover, since the lender can only look to the property for repayment of the principal,
the limiteds should, presumably, be able to claim their pro rata share of the step-up in
basis due to the mortgage indebtedness.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(a)(2) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6771, 1964-2 Cum. Bun. 177.
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outset in a manner that seeks to anticipate the source of funds used to
repay the loan. In the usual case, those funds will be generated from the
operation of the property itself. The personal liability of the general
partner comes into play only in the unusual situation where the project
does not produce funds sufficient to meet the mortgage obligations.
From these premises, it follows that each of the limited partners should,
on a proper interpretation of Section 752 of the Code, be entitled at
the outset to a pro rata increase in the basis of his partnership interest
on account of the loan to the partnership. Only in those cases where the
personal liability of the general partner is brought into play will there
be need to readjust the basis of partnership interests. Finally, it is
argued that even if the Regulation is held valid the limited partner
should be permitted to increase the basis in his interest as the general
partner is required to reduce his basis when the loan, in fact, is amortized with partnership funds. Once this reallocation of basis takes place,
the limited partner should be able, though perhaps with suspension of
losses. at the partnership level, to take the full share of depreciation
deduction allocated to him by the terms of the partnership agreement.
These, in brief, are the major arguments advanced in the body of this
article. Only time will tell whether they will meet with success in the
courts.
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